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WASHINGTON POST
4 MAY 1972

STATINTL

[redacted]

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

By Jack Anderson

Spy Equipment

American intelligence agencies are pefecting bizarre surveillance devices which make James Bond's gadgets look Victorian.

Some of the equipment is already in use by government agencies engaged in snooping.

The devices depend on lasers, infrared rays and microwaves to eavesdrop, pierce the darkness and peek through keyholes.

The ancient art of training pigeons, for example, has been combined with modern laser techniques. Keen-eyed pigeons have been trained to fly wherever they see a split-second flash of red made by a laser beam.

The beam may be subliminally flashed on the window-sills, say, of a foreign embassy or military conference room. A pigeon, with an adhesive-encased "bug" stuck to his chest, flies to the sill. He is trained to snatch off the adhesive-coated microphone-transmitter, which then drops to the sill.

The "bug" records all conversations in the room. When the intelligence agency wants to retrieve the "bug," it flashes another laser beam. The pigeon flies to the sill, presses his body to the adhesive packet and flies home.

Another laser device simply focuses on a window pane of a room in which people are talking. Their conversation causes minute vibrations of the pane. The pane acts as a mirror, bouncing back the laser beam with an "image" of the vibrations. These are "translated" into voices by a laser receiving set.

Still another eavesdropper floods a room with microwaves and then "reads" the changes in the microwave configuration caused by voices in the room. The Russians used a similar technique successfully against our embassy in Moscow for years.

Lasers have also been developed to heat up a spot on an enemy tank or ship. Then, heat-homing missiles are fired which dart accurately to the heated spot.

Ingenious U.S. infrared experts have fashioned giant searchlights which illuminate whole areas for those with special viewers. The "spotlights" can be mounted on helicopters to reveal troops in pitch darkness. Or they can be set atop buildings to expose the movements of rioters in the dark.

The infrared devices, however, also "illuminate" the dangers of this new family of snoopers. Tests on infrared cameras showed that a 1/1000th flash at 20 feet burned rabbits' retinas.

A former consultant to the Defense Department, Dr. Milton Zaret has confirmed that the lasers not only bounce off the glass, but penetrate the rooms. The lasers, microwaves and infrared beams can cause cataracts and other long-range injuries to people they strike.

Thus, electronic smog created by the surveillance equipment may be ruining the eyes of spies, Communist diplomats and innocent citizens who just happen to be in or near the rooms when the hazardous rays are unleashed.

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JACK'S PROBLEM

President Nixon has ordered an allout investigation of columnist Jack Anderson. He has warned the bureaucracy that he expects results or "heads will roll"!

Anderson's recent series of exposes have been highly embarrassing to the Administration, and Mr. Nixon has no intention of letting Anderson continue embarrassing him during the campaign. He not only wants to discredit him but he wants to prosecute him for the theft of classified Government documents.

As pointed out in the last WO, Anderson published the highly secret minutes of the meetings of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group headed by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger. The FBI was ordered to find the leak. Unfortunately, the once highly efficient FBI, which is now run by two senior functionaries, Alex Rosen and Mark Felt, has deteriorated. The Bureau can't even find who filched hundreds of classified documents from its own files, nor has it been able to find the persons or person who bombed the U.S. Capitol a year ago.

The FBI is now largely preoccupied with hiring criminals as stool pigions and agents provacateurs to frame patriots like Congressman John Dowdy (D-Tex), Robert Miles and Robert De Pugh.

Disgusted with the lack of effective action, President Nixon directed a full-scale investigation by task forces composed of agents from several investigative agencies. While persons interviewed are admonished by the agents not to tell they were interviewed, columnist Anderson seems to be well aware of the intensive inquiry. He writes: "The White House, in its effort to discredit us and whitewash the International Telephone & Telegraph scandal, is conducting a massive undercover campaign.

"The manpower has been drawn from the White House, Justice Department, Republican National Committee and the Committee for the Re-election of the President. Even the Justice Department's Internal Security Division, which is supposed to investigate spies and saboteurs, has been put on our trail. Dozens of government gumshoes, Presidential aides and political flunkies have been assigned to investigate us, and to plant stories in the press against us.

"ITT has also retained the world's most famous and formidable private investigating firm, Intertel, to assist with the investigation. This is the same outfit that broke Swiss bank secrecy and exposed Clifford Irving's phony autobiography of billionaire Howard Hughes.

"Intertel submits its investigative report to ITT, which has made them available to the White House. Presidential aides, in turn, have fed the material to Republican Senators for use against us."

Here is something that Mr. Anderson may not know: about a dozen more private detective agencies have also been hired. One of these agencies employed arranged the entrapment of Anderson when he was caught red-handed bugging the hotel suite of Bernard Goldfine. WO has a written statement by one of the investigators who participated in the Goldfine investigation. This ploy almost cost Anderson his career as a snooper. These teams of clever investigators are quite capable of entrapping Anderson again. Moreover, the most highly sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment, including x-ray video tape that can penetrate walls, is being utilized. This phenomenal equipment was developed by the CIA, and is operated by a CIA technician in the Anderson investigation.

Anderson is not even aware that this kind of equipment exists.

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JAN 9 1972

3 in City Suspects in Bomb Plot

BY RONALD KOZIOL AND THOMAS POWERS

Federal agents were investigating three Chicagoans yesterday in the plot in which time bombs were placed in safe-deposit boxes in nine banks in three cities.

In Chicago, the banks were the First National, Northern Trust, and Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Co.

Under surveillance were a Chicago jeweler, the person who leased an apartment on the North Side to which mail for the safe-deposit renter was delivered, and a friend of the leaser of the apartment. The friend had been introduced to the rental agent as a part-time roommate.

Agents believe that altho only one person planted the bombs in banks in Chicago, New York City, and San Francisco, a second person aided him in preparing the bombs.

Mohr Is Absolved

Police definitely had learned:

● That Christopher Charles Mohr, whose name was used in renting the bank boxes, is not involved in any way. He is serving in the Army in Viet Nam, and his identification was stolen in December, 1970, in Los Angeles.

● That the person who signed a lease on an apartment at 560 W. Arlington Pl. in December, 1970, is not the same person who rented the safe-deposit boxes, altho that address was used by the person who made the rentals.

The rental agent for the apartment cooperated with federal agents in locating the man who signed the lease. He moved out shortly after renting the flat, owing $300 rent, and was tracked down by a collection agency.

Explosion Tips Plot

Altho mail addressed to Mohr began arriving at the flat from the various banks in 1971, agents were not aware of the bomb plot until Sept. 5, when a bomb exploded in a San Francisco safe-deposit box rented by a man who identified himself as Mohr.

Investigators dertermined that the lease signer was not Mohr and began a hunt for the real Mohr. At the same time, acting on a tip, the FBI placed the jeweler and the other suspect under surveillance.

One of the men reportedly is an expert on wiring devices and is a former jeweler.

The FBI has pieced together a description of the bomber from information received from bank employes who took his application for safe deposit boxes.

A federal source said the suspect is in his late twenties, 5 feet, 9 inches tall, has short, well-groomed hair, and was termed "very articulate." Those interviewed said the suspect wore a business suit and carried a briefcase.

All the bombs found in the safe-deposit boxes Friday were wired to electronic calendar clocks, which could be detonated at any time during a 217-day period.

Opposed to Viet War

The man who is believed to have planted the bombs reportedly is not connected with the radical faction known as the Weathermen or other organized militant groups but is violently opposed to United States participation in the Viet Nam War.

Federal agents were forced to go thru a namecheck in their search for the real Mohr and were aided by the Internal Revenue Service. They finally learned that the real Mohr was employed by a West Coast firm and that he had been drafted shortly after his credentials were stolen.

The real Mohr, it was learned, was placed under surveillance by military intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and FBI agents for a period of time before he was interrogated.

After the agents became convinced that Mohr was in no way involved in the early San Francisco explosion, the focus of the search returned to Chicago because agents feared other bombs had been planted in other banks by the same man.

Surveillance on the two suspects was doubled.

Letters Sent to Papers

However, no progress was made in locating the other bombs until the bomber sent letters to columnists on selected newspapers in the three cities.

The letters arrived shortly before midnight Thursday and the FBI immediately was notified. Agents were present when the safe-deposit boxes were opened and the devices deactivated.

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NEW YORK TIMES
19 NOV 1971

STATINTL

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PENTAGON SEARCHES NEWS ROOM DESKS

WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (AP) —The Defense Department acknowledged today that its security agents had again conducted nighttime searches of desks in the Pentagon press room but said that it was a mistake and would not be repeated.

A spokesman said that Daniel Z. Henkin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for public affairs, "was very distressed to know this happened." The spokesman said that Mr. Henkin had been told by the security people this "was an inadvertent check" and will not happen again."

Reporters were given a similar assurance by Mr. Henkin several months ago but on arriving for work yesterday found cards on the desks of correspondents for Time magazine and The New York Daily News that said:

"An inspection of this office area by the Pentagon Counter-Intelligence Force revealed no violations of security regulations."

The Pentagon spokesman, Brig. Gen. Daniel James, said that the Counter-Intelligence Force regularly checked all Pentagon offices to make sure that safes were locked and no classified materials left out overnight.

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WASHINGTON POST
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STATINTL

Capitol Punishment

Spies Spend $$

By Art Buchwald

NEW YORK—There was a very angry reaction last week by some Americans to the United Nations vote on China. Sen. Barry Goldwater suggested we kick the United Nations out of New York. Sen. James Buckley called for the United States to refuse to fund it.

In purely economic terms we believe that those calling for the end of the United Nations are making a mistake. The United Nations brings in far more money to New York than it takes out.

For example, the budget for spying among the U.N. members is estimated to be over $1 billion.

We have the word of J. Edgar Hoover himself that the United Nations has more spies in it than any international organization. And the most important thing about this fact is that *spies spend money.*

A recent survey revealed that U.N. spies were the biggest spenders of any group in New York City. They ate at the best restaurants, stayed at the best hotels, hired the most attractive women, and were the biggest tippers.

An American economist told me that if it weren't for the money that foreign spies spend in the United States, our balance of payments deficit would be twice what it is today.

A top restaurateur said, "We've been in a terrible slump in the past few years since legitimate businessmen have been ordered to cut out lavish spending at lunch or dinner. If it wasn't for the spies attached to U.N. delegations, we would have to close our doors."

"I don't think they counted that much," I said.

"It isn't just the spies that bring in the business," he said, "It's what they bring in with them, too. Every time a Russian spy reserves a table for dinner, we also get a reservation for a table from the FBI, and one from the CIA, and one from the KGB—the Soviet secret service.

"Why would the KGB reserve an extra table if one of their own spies were having dinner there?"

"They don't trust each other."

A hotel manager confirmed that U.N. spies were keeping his place going. "When a Cuban U.N. delegate takes a hotel room, the Secret Service takes the room next to him," he said. "Navy intelligence takes the room on top of him, the State Department security people take the room below him, and we rent out the entire basement for equipment to bug his room.

'We couldn't afford to take care of New York policemen for free if it wasn't for money that U.N. spies bring in."

Another hotel manager said he had rented out an entire floor to Arab U.N. delegates directly over Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban's suite, when Eban last came to town.

He said, "The nice thing about spies at the United Nations is that they don't cause any trouble. They are very quiet. All they're interested in doing is getting information and they usually talk in a whisper."

There is great excitement over the Red Chinese coming here to the United Nations. "They will have to assume every Chinese U.N. delegate is a spy," a Chinese restaurant owner said, "and I understand the FBI has already doubled its entertainment budget for its New York City office."

'But," I said, "suppose the Red Chinese delegates turn out not to be big spenders."

"Who cares," he replied. "Every person in New York of Chinese descent will be suspect, and what we don't make on Red Chinese U.N. spies, we'll recoup on the FBI following Chinese people who were born in Brooklyn."

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Clamping the Lid on Embarrassment

By Jack Anderson

Ever since we reported on the drunken antics of an Agency for International Development official during Vice President Spiro T. Agnew's recent visit to Kenya, AID has been tightening the lid on classified messages.

FBI agents are grilling officials and giving lie detector tests to find out who leaked the secret report. Copy machines have been moved to secured areas where they are constantly monitored.

All these precautions have been taken in the name of national security. Yet our story, which precipitated the manhunt, had nothing to do with security.

We quoted from a message that Robinson McIlvane, the American ambassador to Kenya, sent to Dr. John Hannah, the AID administrator. The message was so sensitive that it was hand-delivered to Hannah under seal. He was upset, therefore, when we printed it for 45 million Americans to read.

But the subject of the message was the hijinks of Bert Tollefson, who is in charge of the AID program in Kenya. Alleged the hush-hush message:

"The problem started with Bert's well-known pushiness and general lack of sensitivity and culminated in his getting sloshed at Treetops (a night club), making passes at the vice president's secretary and trying to drag her down the steps to meet an elephant at ground level."

Tollefson assured us by telephone from Nairobi that it was all a misunderstanding, and blamed the whole episode on unidentified Democratic holdovers.

But Hannah took urgent steps to make sure we don't get any more of his secret messages. He issued terse instructions, intended for the eyes only of those who handle sensitive documents.

As evidence that Hannah hasn't yet plugged the leak, here are his new instructions:

"The reproduction of the State's NODIS, EXDIS, and TOP SECRET and the AID's EYES ONLY and TOP SECRET messages requires the approval of the AID Executive secretary, and such reproduction can be accomplished only by the EXSEC Staff. . . .

"All reproduction and copy machines are being located in in secured areas, which will be monitored. . . . During non-working hours, all copy machines will be secured in such a way that they are inoperable."

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What do you know about YOUR CREDIT SHADOW?

dwin Black, a free-lance writer, ɔent three months investigating the =edit bureau industry in Chicago. This - the first of his two-part series.

By Edwin Black

JOSEPH CURRY—Chicago salesman with a wife and child, two-bedroom home, one car, a dog and a color TV—decided it was time to move up to a better paying job. So Joe applied to a new company, was interviewed and hired. Wonderful, right?

Wonderful, wrong. Because now, Joe is working day after day with a boss who knows how long it takes him to pay bills, and what bills he didn't pay last month, from whom and how often he borrows money, whom his close friends are, what his neighbors think of him—and worst of all, that he was sued by his former wife five years ago for nonpayment of alimony.

Shocking? Not to the boss, who checks into the personal life of possible employes every day. It's routine, and as easy as picking up the phone and dialing the number of the credit bureau.

Every transaction you make, cash or credit, is a possible entry into your own credit history. Since you reached 21, your life has been capsulized on computer tape and index cards and filed with the credit bureau.

And that information is available, not only to employers and creditors, but to detective agencies, the federal government, and even your next door neighbors. It amounts to a giant credit shadow, lurking behind you every step of the way.

Credit defined is simply trust, from the Latin word credo, which means "I believe." A retail store or mail-order house will trust you with merchandise or services on your promise to pay. Without this magical American phenomenon, large department stores would lose 60 per cent of their business, chain stores 40 per cent, and the economy in general would shrivel.

Credit sales are so important that J. C. Penney didn't mind spending over $20 million last year to support its charge and revolving charge accounts department.

To minimize the high risk of granting credit, an entire industry has been created—the credit bureau industry. In Chicago, creditors utilize three major consumer credit reporting bureaus—Credit Bureau of Cook County, Chicago Credit Bureau and TRW Credit Data.

Credit Bureau of Cook County, largest in the world, stockpiles information on five million Chicago-area individuals. Each file contains an address and employment history, a complete list of existing credit accounts or purchases, the length of time it took to pay the bills, any existing unpaid bills, any financial lawsuits including full docket details, any liens, any bank accounts, any loans, any inquiries from any other creditors and anything else of surface interest to any business concern contemplating extending any credit of any size, on any terms.

Altho most of this data is now stored manually in long rows of metal files, C. B. C. C. by July 1, will convert totally to CHRONUS, a gigantic computer system that retrieves complete files in less than a second. For under $2, this information is available to any registered C. B. C. C. subscriber.

Who can subscribe? Retail establishments, oil companies, airlines, banks, loan companies, detective agencies, government agencies, private social clubs, doctors, dentists, lawyers—any legitimate businessman or company. The subscriber merely phones in his identification code and the facts are immediately found and read over the phone. For an additional charge, a typed copy will be mailed. No purpose need be given. It's that simple and happens thousands of times each day from 3,200 subscribers thruout the city and even out of state.

To illustrate how accessible these confidential reports are, I obtained a full report on a business friend thru five different bureaus. C. B. C. C. released the information to a doctor friend of mine registered with the bureau. TRW Credit Data released the information to a clerk working in a small clothing shop. Chicago Credit Bureau blindly cooperated with a used car salesman. And two other minor bureaus co-operated with me after I first pretended to verify the code number of a large department store, and then called again using that code number.

TRW Credit Data is a national service that stores all its records in an expansive computer complex in California. TRW has information on four million Chicago area residents along with millions of individuals in other cities, but limits its reports strictly to consumer credit reports [no character reports]. It maintains a unique "protest code" to indicate whether a consumer disputes an unpaid bill and will not deliver information to any seekers except those who grant credit. This at least excludes detective agencies and kindred snoops.

Chicago Credit Bureau, the city's first credit bureau, is as yet uncomputerized. It follows a credit check philosophy similar to TRW's, but offers an extra service to its hundreds of Chicagoland clients: confidential character reports which are written evaluations of a consumer's "personal history, character, integrity, credit record and health," to quote the current pamphlet. These confidential reports are available to subscribers for $5 each and to nonsubscribers [inquirers with only an occasional need] for $10 each.

While Chicago Credit Bureau limits these profiles to its credit extending clients, other bureaus offer much more detailed reports to almost anyone. For $15, Credit Bureau of Cook County sells what they call a "P-code" report ["P" [illegible] investigations that include past associa-

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FBI Document Calls College Aide a Source

By Betty Medsger
Washington Post Staff Writer

A secretary at Swarthmore College has been an FBI source for at least six years, according to a copy of an FBI document received by The Washington Post yesterday.

Marjorie Webb, secretary to the college registrar, was identified in earlier copies of documents sent out anonymously by the Citizens Commission to Investigate the FBI as "an established source" whose identity should "be protected."

Four copies of FBI documents with Miss Webb's name on them were among 23 received yesterday. They were sent to The Washington Post by Martha Shirk, editor of The Phoenix, the Swarthmore College student newspaper.

Miss Shirk said she received the copies of FBI documents last week from the Citizens Commission, the group that has taken credit for the March 8 raid on an FBI office in Media, Pa.

The Swarthmore College secretary is one of several college employees cited as regular FBI informers in the more than 60 copies of documents that have been distributed by the Citizens Commission. Miss Webb's identity has been revealed in articles in the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin and the campus paper.

Swarthmore president Dr. Robert D. Cross said April 9 that faculty, students and staff members of the Philadelphia-area college risk dismissal if they divulge confidential information to the FBI or other government agencies.

Inquiry Under Way

A campus investigation into whether campus employees were acting wrongly in collaborating with the FBI is now under way a[illegible]

One of the four copies received yesterday containing Miss Webb's name as a source was of a November 1965 administration-faculty memorandum.

"Received confidentially from Miss Webb" was handwritten across that memorandum, the subject of which was how college personnel should respond to "inquiries concerning applicants or nominees for governmental positions."

That college document, later passed on to the FBI, said, "Unfavorable information pertaining to an individual's character, morals, conduct or mental condition should not be made available unless required under subpoena."

Miss Webb's relationship with the FBI first came to light in a document received earlier that described an FBI investigation of the daughter of Rep. Henry S. Reuss (D-Wis.).

Documents received yesterday indicated that surveillance of Miss Reuss, now a senior at Swarthmore, was more elaborate than had earlier been revealed.

One document received yesterday says what grades Miss Reuss achieved in her courses. Other documents reveal that surveillance of Miss Reuss involved the CIA, the Milwaukee Police Department and the Philadelphia Police Department.

Former SDS Member

Miss Reuss formerly was a member of Students for a Democratic Society, but she said she is not involved in any organizations now. Her father has been critical of the inves[illegible]

the FBI has no business c[illegible] piling dossiers "on million[illegible] Americans who are accused of no wrongdoing."

In regard to investigations of applications for government jobs, an April 1967 document calls for caution on the part of the agent and urges him not to conduct such investigations on campuses unless it is necessary. Persons being interviewed for such background information, said the document, should be fully informed of the reasons for the interviews.

But there was a very different attitude toward "on campus" FBI work last fall when, another document says, "resident agents" were asked to furnish information about the "current number of university or college sources on the academic or administrative staff including security officers . . . the number of current student security informants or PSIs (potential student informants)."

Names Listed

The names of agents and the colleges for which each of them is responsible is listed in that document.

Among the documents received yesterday were copies of the Swarthmore campus newspaper that had been filed by the FBI and copies of memorandums from the Swarthmore Police Department.

Two of the police documents were lists of car license numbers, names and addresses. One list was data about cars, cycles and scooters on the campus without college permits.

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STATINTL

A SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT

The Theory and Practice of American Political Intelligence

Frank Donner

I

The twentieth century has been marked by a succession of different forms of restraint on political expression: criminal anarchy statutes, sedition laws, deportations, Congressional anti-subversive probes, loyalty oaths, enforced registration. These and related measures still survive. But in recent years new, more formidable ways of responding to political and social movements on the left have emerged. The most important of these is the system of political intelligence, which is rapidly coalescing into a national network.[1]

Despite the efforts of intelligence officials to keep intelligence operations secret, reliable information about our intelligence system is steadily accumulating. We now have a clearer picture of the methods and targets of political surveillance. As a result, we can no longer seriously doubt that the main purpose of such activity is political control of dissent or that the frequently advanced justifications of law enforcement or national security are often no more than a "cover."

On March 21, 1971, a group calling itself the Citizens' Commission to Investigate the FBI mailed or delivered to a congressman and senator as well as to the Washington *Post*, *The New York Times*, and the Los Angeles *Times* a packet containing fourteen documents, selected from over 1,000 stolen from a small FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania, a suburb of Philadelphia. The fourteen documents, all of them of recent date and undisputed authenticity, show that the FBI concentrates much of its investigative effort on college dissenters and black student groups. According to a memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover such groups "pose a definite threat to the Nation's stability and security," a conclusion that he has not been able to support and that both the Washington *Post* and *The New York Times* have challenged.

When conducting surveillance of a Swarthmore College philosophy professor regarded as a "radical," the FBI enlisted the assistance of the local police and postmaster, as well as a campus security officer and switchboard operator. In one of the documents, the FBI agent in charge of the Philadelphia bureau instructs his agents at Media that more interviews are

> . . . in order . . . for plenty of reasons, chief of which are it will enhance the paranoia endemic in these circles and will further serve to get the point across that there is an FBI agent behind every mailbox. In addition, some will be overcome by the overwhelming personalities of the contacting agent and will volunteer to tell all—perhaps on a continuing basis.

Dramatic disclosures of this sort as well as the recent Senate hearings on Army intelligence will undoubtedly help to cure the surviving skepticism about these practices. Until fairly recently even the targets of surveillance were reluctant to credit the existence of police activities which violate the most deeply held premises of their society. But political surveillance has become so obtrusive and its targets so numerous that it can no longer be easily ignored or justified. A sharper awareness of intelligence has, in turn, opened up new sources of data about a field which I have been researching since the McCarthy era.[2]

Of course dossiers, informers, and infiltrators are hardly new. But since the early Sixties, when attorneys general in the South formed a rudimentary intelligence network in order to curb the integrationist activities of students, political surveillance and associated practices have spread throughout the nation. Surveillance has expanded largely because of the scale and militance of the protest movements that erupted in the Sixties. Policy makers and officers of intelligence agencies were then faced with the need to identify and control new actors on a new political stage—no easy matter in view of the anarchic radical milieu, characterized by highly mobile and anonymous young people, who tend to be hostile to formal organization and leadership. The social remoteness of new radicals concentrated in "tribal," self-contained groups made it all the more difficult to identify them.

Most of the existing intelligence agencies at that time were no more effective than other institutions in our society. Their techniques were as outmoded as their notions of subversion dominated by an old Left composed of "Communists," "fellow travelers," and "fronts." Intelligence files were choked with millions of dossiers of aging or dead radicals. At the same time, new gadgetry—miniaturization, audio-electronics, infrared lens cameras, computers, and data banks—gave intelligence possibilities undreamed of by the most zealous practitioners of the repressive arts of the nineteenth century.

According to the herald of the "technetronic" society, Zbigniew Brzezinski, new developments in technology will make it "possible to assert almost continuous surveillance over every citizen and maintain up-to-date files, containing even personal information about the . . . behavior of the citizen, in addition to the more customary data." Full access to critical data, he adds, will give the undercover agent and the roving political spy greater flexibility in planning and executing countermeasures.[3]

continued

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11 FEB 1971

PASSPORT OFFICE HAS SECRET FILE

243,135 Names in Computer ---Applications Screened

By BEN A. FRANKLIN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 10—The United States Passport Office acknowledged today that it keeps a secret, computerized file of 243,135 Americans whose applications for passports may be of interest to it or to Government law enforcement agencies. Persons listed in the file may never be aware of it.

The existence of the file was disclosed by Senator Sam J. Ervin Jr., the chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, who is a persistent critic of what he considers Government surveillance and file-keeping abuses.

In a speech last night before a symposium at Dickinson College in Carlisle, Pa., Senator Ervin said he had discovered the Passport Office file through a reply to his subcommittee's questionnaires. He called it more proof that uncontrolled and undercover Government surveillance was a serious threat to the exercise of the First Amendment rights of free speech and freedom to associate.

File Is Defended

In an interview today Miss Frances Knight, the Passport Office director since 1955, said, "A passport is a United States document addressed to foreign Governments in which we are saying, 'This person is an American citizen.'"

She said that "a vast majority"—perhaps 90 per cent—of those listed in the file were persons of "questionable citizenship" about whom it was her obligation to be curious and cautious in issuing an official document.

A spokesman for Senator Ervin, however, said today that the State Department had reported to him in writing that the largest group of names on the list was in the "known or suspected Communists or subversives" category and that the number of names under "doubtful citizenship" ranked second. The number in each of these categories was not immediately available.

"We are guarding the integrity of the passport by verifying United States citizenship," Miss Knight said. But she expressed surprise at the large number of names on the list.

Miss Knight said she had been ill for the last three weeks and away from her desk. Until she summoned aides to her office this afternoon, she said, she was unaware that Senator Ervin had made official inquiries about the file or that it was a matter of controversy. The State Department's reply to Mr. Ervin's questionnaire was dated Jan. 4.

Hearings Start Feb. 23

Senator Ervin has scheduled nine days of public hearings before his subcommittee starting Feb. 23 on what he has called the growth of "police state" surveillance and dossier-keeping on perhaps 50 million Americans, most of them accused of breaking no laws.

The North Carolina Democrat, a former judge on his state's Supreme Court, said last night that while there might be legitimate reasons for maintaining portions of the Passport Office file, many of the justifications for it given to his subcommittee by the State Department were "beyond any reason whatsoever."

He said a State Department reply to a subcommittee questionnaire listed these categories:

¶"Individual's actions do not reflect to the credit of the U. S. abroad (1,040 persons)."

¶Defectors, expatriates and repatriates whose background demands further inquiry prior to issuance of a passport.

¶Persons wanted by a law enforcement agency for criminal activity.

¶Individuals involved in a child custody or desertion case.

¶Delinquents or suspected delinquents in military service.

¶"Known or suspected Communists or subversives."

'Orange Card'

Senator Ervin said other categories included simply "orange card" and "miscellaneous."

"I don't know what 'orange card' means, and I don't think they know either," he told the Dickinson College gathering.

Asked if he thought the Central Intelligence Agency had inserted names in the file, Mr. Ervin said, "I can't prove it but I suspect the C.I.A. gets just about anything it wants."

He said the State Department had acknowledged maintaining a secret surveillance file of passport applicants in which "the individual is not told that he is in the file" until and unless "adverse action" is taken. It was not clear today how this would operate in actual practice.

Miss Knight said her office would merely report quietly to "the interested agency" — the Federal Bureau of Investigation or a state law enforcement agency with a fugitive warrant, for example — that a person listed in the file had applied for a passport.

Whether "adverse action" would ensue was none of her interest, she said, and she would not notify the subject of his listing in the file.

Miss Knight said she would not necessarily notify anyone that he was included in the file even if the "adverse action" were taken in her own office, through the denial of a passport.

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The Federal Diary

Consider Whom the Searchers Search

By Mike Causey

The government's guardians of morality rarely frisk an agency head, or require a balloon test of a chief returning from his favorite luncheon watering hole. But they do make spot checks of lockers and personal work areas of the lesser ranks, seeking suspected booze, guns and dope.

On Jan. 14, a surprise locker check at the Government Printing Office turned up a half pint of strong drink. The security people say it was found, in a printer's coat pocket, in his locked locker. He says he was framed. A union representative was invited to, and did attend, the search party to make sure it was done legally.

Whether he was framed or not isn't too important, except to this particular man and his future federal career. But it is interesting when you consider who gets searched, and who doesn't get searched.

The idea, of course, is that people aren't supposed to drink on the job, except at lunch if they have the time and money. Nor are they supposed to shoot dope or coworkers while on the federal payroll.

But suppose for a minute that the locker that was searched had belonged to the deputy director of an agency, who would have a nice desk and office instead of a dual key locker. What then?

If building guards found a pint or fifth in Mr. Supergrade's belongings they would naturally assume that he was taking it home. He probably bought it in the District because it was handier, and cheaper, than at home in Virginia or Maryland. He might even be violating state laws by taking too much untaxed whisky in at one trip.

However, if the stuff is found in the locker of a low-paid postal employee (as it often is) or near a printer, most people assume the fellow was tippling on the job. Even if it hadn't been opened we could assume he was planning to take a snort at the first opportunity.

The stigma of half-pint purchases is especially strong among the more affluent, who realize it is cheaper by the half gallon.

Assuming that drinking on the job is bad no matter who does it, is there any real difference between a boss tossing down a couple during an extended lunch and his lesser paid subordinate, who may have a shorter break, having a drink in a friend's parked car?

The search question is a problem. On certain military installations, and in places like the CIA or NSA, it's assumed that just about anybody may get the hands-up-treatment, to insure he isn't taking home state secrets.

Likewise, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing has ways to make sure that people don't carry off "bricks" of new money, or the plates that would enable them to print their own at home for fun and profit. Few people would knock that kind of security.

But at a place like GPO, where the hottest item to steal might be yesterday's Congressional Record, one wonders. It seems more likely that searches are made at agencies where rules permit it, or where there are large numbers of low-paid people.

General Services Administration, which supplies guards to many non-defense buildings, says it would never search a locker or personal work area unless there was a report of a bomb planted. Still, most agencies do have internal security, inspection or audit units that are authorized to make searches.

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Supports surveillance

On Dec. 16 it was revealed that in Illinois some 800 persons were under secret surveillance by the CIA, as told by a former member in CIA in Illinois.

Then followed much criticism by some of those who were mentioned as being under surveillance by the military. Such secret surveillance should be permissable in order to determine grassroots classification and identification of activities of selected persons who object to procedures and policy making policies of the U.S. government. When an elective or appointive public servant takes the oath, he or she should be a subject to secret surveillance by the U.S. Government and-or its government agencies.

I support such secret surveillance by the military and-or the U.S. government. I feel that every elective or appointive public servant under the oath, should be a subject to such surveillances without the invasion of privacy.

Such surveillance could produce concrete evidence that a member of Congress, or the U.S. Senate, could possible be working with underground anarchists, and revolutionary groups in a direction to reject society, foreign policies and other administration policies.

This could easily apply to government employees and professional educators, as well as civic organizations. It should be noted with all the revolutionary movements in the United States, and throughout the world, that more secret surveillance should be conducted of individuals, group organizations and elective officials.

Any political party member who rejects secret surveillance by the CIA or the U.S. government should be subject to rejection by the voters on election day.

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